An Agent for the Prospect Presentation Problem by Amos Azaria et al.
An Agent for the Prospect Presentation Problem
Amos Azaria
Dept. of Computer Science
Bar Ilan University, Israel
Ariella Richardson
Dept. of Industrial Engineering
Jerusalem College of
Technology, Israel
Sarit Kraus
Dept. of Computer Science
Bar Ilan University, Israel
ABSTRACT
Evaluating complex propositions that are composed of sev-
eral lotteries is a dicult task for humans. Presentation
styles can aect the acceptance rate of such proposals. We
introduce an agent that chooses between two presentation
methods, while aspiring to maximize proposal acceptance.
Our agent uses decision theory in order to model human be-
havior and uses the model to select the presentation which
maximizes its expected outcome. We examine several deci-
sion theories, and use machine learning to adapt them to our
domain. We perform an extensive evaluation of our agent in
comparison to other baseline agents and show that presen-
tation can indeed aect the acceptance rate of propositions
and that the agent we propose succeeds in selecting bene-
cial presentations.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many systems are designed to encourage users to accept
benecial proposals. Complex propositions often confuse the
user and make the decision non-trivial. It is well known that
problem presentation [17, 7, 3] may have an impact on the
human decision-making process. In our work we consider
benecial proposals which are composed of several gains or
losses, that are associated with varying probabilities and
must be accepted or rejected together. We will compare two
possible presentation methods (for the possible outcomes
and their associated probabilities) for each proposal: a sep-
arate presentation and a combined presentation. Many real
life situations resemble our problem.
Our rst example is a medical system which assists a doc-
tor or patient in deciding whether to use a certain medica-
tion. The medication is associated with one or more benets,
such as curing the infection or reducing pain, and also with
several side eects, such as headache, nausea, rash or an al-
lergic reaction. These outcomes have varied signicance; for
instance, a headache might be slightly unpleasant whereas
an allergic reaction could be life threatening. Each of these
outcomes is also associated with a certain probability; for ex-
ample, the probability of overcoming the infection may be
90% while the side eect of a headache might occur in 20% of
the patients, whereas an allergic reaction might only become
evident in 0:5% of the patients. The expected overall reac-
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tion to the medication must be positive (otherwise it is more
harmful than helpful). In order to decide whether to use a
medication, all of the potential benets and the risk of side
eects must be evaluated together. Combining the various
components is associated with a cost, since it is unclear how
to quantify a headache compared to a rash. Dierent peo-
ple may associate dierent values with each benet or side
eect. Therefore assigning values to the components using a
joined metric would require some eort, such as questioning
many people on their preferences, and therefore impose a
cost.
Another example is an investment adviser who is trying
to build an investment portfolio for one of his customers.
Some stocks have a higher risk but also oer an opportunity
to receive greater interest, while on the other hand one can
invest in a bond with a lower risk and a lower interest level.
Most people combine dierent stocks and bonds, combining
dierent levels of risk. The investment adviser's primary
goal is to get the customer to invest her money, therefore he
would like to show the portfolio to the customer using the
most appealing presentation. Should the investment adviser
show the expected probability and value of revenue (or loss)
for each stock, or should he try to combine all stocks in a
single chart which presents the total investment?
Our last example is a travel agent who would like to pro-
mote the sales for a specic vacation package. Every day of
a multiple-day vacation has some probability of rain or heat
load (the strength of the rain or heat load may also vary).
The travel agent wants to show the customer the probabil-
ities for rain on each of the planned days. How should the
travel agent present these probabilities (while his goal is to
sell the package)? Should he present them for every day
separately, or should he combine them all in one chart?
In order to determine how to present complex propos-
als, we propose an automated agent that utilizes behavioral
economic theory. A prospect is a lottery (possibly with sev-
eral outcomes, where each outcome has its own probability)
[12], and a simple prospect is a prospect with some prob-
ability p to gain or lose some amount x and gain or lose
nothing otherwise. The problems we study in this paper
are composed of several simple prospects. These prospects
must either all be accepted or all be rejected (there is no
option to accept a partial set of prospects) and the system
gains from accepted proposals. In the medical system we
described earlier, the benet of cure infection with a prob-
ability of 90% (and 10% of not curing the infection) is an
example of a prospect, and similarly so is the side eect of
acquiring a headache with a probability of 20% (and 80%of not resulting in a headache). All of the prospects must
be selected or rejected together since a patient either takes
the medication or does not. The agent we propose must de-
cide whether to present the proposal in a separate method,
as is, or in a combined method, combining all of the sim-
ple prospects into a single (more complex) prospect. For
example, in the medical system the separate method would
list all of the separate prospects. In combined presentation
combining the curing prospect with the headache prospect
results with a 72% chance that infection will be cured with-
out the headache side eect appearing, an 18% chance that
the infections will be cured and a headache will appear, an
8% that the infection will not be cured and no headache
will appear and nally a 2% chance that the infection will
not be cured and that a headache will appear. Note that
in the combined method all of the probabilities add up to
100%. We assumed, and show experimentally, that present-
ing the problem as a set of simple prospects or as a combined
prospect is not necessarily equivalent and can aect people's
choices. Thus the automated agent will determine when to
use a separate presentation and when to use a combined
presentation in order to encourage the users to accept the
propositions.
When several prospects are proposed, the issue of brack-
eting arises. Read et al. [15] introduced the term \Choice
Bracketing" to mean the grouping of choices. It has been
shown that when people face several choices in which each
choice has several options, people tend to treat these choices
separately rather than treating them as a single decision.
Our agent must take this into account when considering
whether to use a combined or separate presentation for a
problem, since similarly to what has been shown on sepa-
rated choices, people might also treat each prospect sepa-
rately even if these prospects are part of a group.
Behavioral economic theory describes the decision pro-
cesses that people use when deciding whether to accept a
prospect or reject it. The most signicant theories in this
eld are the Expected Utility Hypothesis [8], the Prospect
Theory [12] and the Cumulative Prospect Theory [19]. We
embed these theories into our agent in order to model the
expected human choice that will be made for a given set of
prospects, in order to determine if the separate or combined
presentation should be used.
We introduce the Prospect Presentation Problem, along
with its formal description. This problem requires selecting
whether to represent the multiple prospects in a separate
presentation or a combined presentation, while maximizing
a system's utility. We propose a method for modeling and
handling grouped separate prospects. We use dierent de-
cision process models and settings in order to compose an
agent that is capable of solving the Prospect Presentation
Problem. We demonstrate the eciency of the agent, in
choosing the better presentation method, using an exten-
sive experimental evaluation.
2. BACKGROUND
Our agent integrates behavioral economic theory, there-
fore we begin by describing the theories upon which we rely
in the next sections.
2.1 Expected Utility Hypothesis
The Expected Utility Hypothesis (EUH) was initiated by
Bernoulli in 1738 [8]. Under this hypothesis, people have a
utility function, u, which associates any possible total wealth
with some utility. People use this function when deciding
whether to accept or reject a lottery simply by maximizing
their expected utility. For example, a person with a current
total wealth of $W facing a prospect (lottery), P, with a
probability of p to win $x and a probability of 1   p to lose
$y, will compare the expected utility from accepting the
oer:
U(P) = u(W + x)  p + u(W   y)  (1   p) (1)
with the expected utility from rejecting the oer, which is
simply u(W). The person will accept the lottery if the for-
mer is greater and reject it otherwise. A common utility
risk averse function, suggested by Bernoulli himself, is the
log function:
u(X) = log(X) (2)
2.2 Prospect Theory
The Prospect Theory was presented by Kahneman and
Tversky in [12] and later rened to the Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT) in [19]. The Prospect Theory is based on
three principles. The rst is that people do not take into
account their total wealth when accepting or rejecting an
uncertain opportunity (as suggested by the expected util-
ity hypothesis [8]), but rather use their current wealth as
a baseline, and will be happy if they win an amount and
become upset if they lose an amount. The second principle
is loss aversion, where people hate losing more than they
like winning. The third principle is that people have a sub-
jective representation of probabilities and do not interpret
probabilities fully rationally, but rather use their own de-
cision weights when deciding whether to reject or accept a
gamble. In his book, Kahneman [11] (p.314) gives the fol-
lowing examples: The decision weight that corresponds to
a 90% chance is 71:2%, while the decision weight that cor-
responds to a 10% chance is 18:6%. According to these ex-
amples, people are likely to prefer a guaranteed outcome of
$80 than a gamble with a 90% chance of winning $100, since
the latter is only worth $71:2 to them. Tversky and Kahne-
man elicited these weights by sequentially asking subjects to
choose between a specic lottery and many dierent guar-
anteed outcomes. The equivalent to the given lottery for a
certain subject was set to the average between the great-
est rejected guaranteed outcome and the smallest accepted
guaranteed outcome [19]. However, these decision weights
depend on people's personalities, their wealth, culture and
the scope of the payo in question. The cumulative prospect
theory determines the value for any prospect based on its
possible outcomes and the probability of each of its out-
comes. Given a prospect P which is composed of T possible
ordered outcomes (as dened by Tversky and Kahneman),
fx1;x2;:::;xTg, and the rst t are negative outcomes, i.e.
x1 < x2 < ::: < xt < 0  xt+1 < ::: < xT. Each outcome
is associated with some probability p(x). The value of the
prospect is given by the following formula:
U(P) =
t X
i=1
v(xi) 
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(3)where v(x) stands for the value function and w is the weight-
ing function (the decision weight function described above).
Both of these functions must be non-decreasing, and w(0) =
0;w(1) = 1. v is negative for losses and positive for gains,
and v(0) = 0. The intuition behind this formula is that
every possible output's value is assumed to have an impact
which is proportionate to the marginal aect that its ac-
cumulated probability has on the weighting function. For
example, given a prospect P
0 with three possible outcomes,
$2, $3 and $10 (no negative outcomes) with probabilities
of p($2) = 0:1;p($3) = 0:7;p($10) = 0:2, the value of the
prospect is given by:
U(P
0) = v($10)  w(0:2) + v($3) 
 
w(0:9)   w(0:2)

+
v($2) 
 
w(1)   w(0:9)

Note that due to the nature of w and v, the value of P
0 is at
least v($2). This complies with the fact that the prospect
guarantees a win of at least $2.
Tversky and Kahneman suggested the value function:
v(x) =
(
x
 if x  0
 ( x)
 if x < 0
(4)
where ; and  are parameters, and the weighting function
is:
w(p) =
p

 
p   (1   p)1  (5)
where  is a parameter used for positive payos and is re-
placed by a dierent parameter, , for positive payos. Sev-
eral studies try to estimate parameters for the Prospect The-
ory [10, 16, 9], however most studies try to maximize the
likelihood of the results obtained by each subject individu-
ally. This approach could not be applied in our work since
we build a model based on a group of users and apply this
model to new users (for whom we have little or no data).
Building a model for each and every user will not allow us
to generalize the model to new subjects.
2.3 Logit Quantal Response
Stochastic decision-making (logit quantal response) sug-
gests that when humans need to make a choice among sev-
eral options, the option yielding the greater utility to the
user is more likely to be chosen than the option yielding a
lesser utility. However, an option yielding a lesser utility
may occasionally be chosen. Logit quantal reaponse is very
common in the literature, [4, 13, 6], and suggests that when
a person confronts several possible choices fC1;C2;:::;C`g
the probability that the person will chose a specic choice
Ci is given by:
p(Ci) =
e
U(Ci)
P`
j=1 eU(Cj) (6)
where U(C) is the utility associated with choice C and  is
a parameter.
2.4 Bracketing
\Choice Bracketing", termed by Read et al. [15], desig-
nates the grouping of individual choices together into sets.
\Broadly Bracketing"indicates that the decision-maker takes
all choices into account when making his decision, while
\Narrow Bracketing" indicates that the decision-maker iso-
lates each choice from all other choices. When humans face
a broad spectrum of topics, where each topic consists of sev-
eral options, they usually make a decision on each topic sep-
arately. A classic experiment that illustrates narrow brack-
eting was done by Tversky and Kahneman [18]. They asked
their subjects the following question:
"Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent de-
cisions. First examine both decisions, then indicate the op-
tions you prefer:
Choice I. Choose between:
A. A guaranteed gain of $240.
B. A 25% chance to gain $1000 and a 75% chance to
gain nothing.
Choice II. Choose between:
C. A guaranteed loss of $750.
D. A 75% chance to lose $1000 and a 25% chance to
lose nothing."
Since people tend to be risk averse with a positive payo
and risk seeking with a negative payo, a large majority of
subjects (73%) chose both A and D. Only 3% of the subjects
chose B and C. Combining A and D yields a 25% chance to
gain $240 and a 75% chance to lose $760. However, com-
bining B and C dominates this with a 25% chance to gain
$250 and a 75% chance to lose $750. Tversky and Kahneman
performed an additional experiment in which they presented
only the following combined choices to the subjects, that is:
Choose between:
A+C. A guaranteed loss of $510.
A+D. A 25% chance to gain $240 and a 75% chance to
lose $760.
B+C. A 25% chance to gain $250 and a 75% chance to
lose $750.
B+D. A 6:25% chance to gain $1000, a 56:25% chance
to lose $1000 and a 37:5% chance to gain or lose
nothing."
This time, not a single subject chose the dominated op-
tion (A+D). This experiment demonstrates that people tend
to treat each decision on its own and do not combine the
choices, unless they are explicitly combined for them.
3. PROSPECTPRESENTATIONPROBLEM
The prospect presentation problem is a decision problem
for a system and is dened as follows. We rst dene a set
of simple prospects s = fP1;P2;:::;Pkig; recall that a sim-
ple prospect P is composed of a probability Pp of gaining or
losing a certain amount, Px. In the prospect presentation
problem, a system has a set of n sets of simple prospects,
S = fs1;s2;:::;sng. Each set s 2 S must be oered to h
human clients. Each of the human clients may either accept
the set of prospects s (and participate in the lotteries as-
sociated with the prospects) or reject it. Each of the sets,
s, may be presented to the human clients in two dierent
presentation modes m(s); the presentation mode may ei-
ther be separate, which indicates that the set of prospects
are presented separately (as they are), or the presentationmode may be combined, which indicates that the prospects
are validly combined into a single prospect. The separate
presentation mode of s is denoted by s
s and the combined
presentation mode of s is denoted by s
c. The probability for
any possible outcome must be identical in both s
s and s
c. A
cost c(m(s)) may be applied to the system and may depend
on the method of presentation. The system gains a utility
of 1 c(m(s)) for every human client that accepts every set
of prospects (depending on its presentation method). The
human clients are assumed to follow a stochastic decision
policy, in which, given a set of prospects, s, and a presenta-
tion mode, m, p(s;m) determines the probability that the
humans will accept the set of prospects. The prospect pre-
sentation problem is intended for the system to determine
for each of the sets of prospects, s, its presentation mode,
m(s), in order to maximize:
X
s2S
p(s;m(s))  h  (1   c(m(s))) (7)
4. AGENTFORPROSPECTPRESENTATION
PROBLEM
In this section we introduce an Agent for the Prospect
Presentation Problem (APPP). Section 4.1 describes how
APPP calculates the combined presentation for a set of
prospects and solves the prospect presentation problem. How-
ever, this solution relies on a component that accurately
models human decision policy. We therefore propose several
alternatives for APPP's composition of the human model in
Section 4.2.
4.1 Solving the Prospect Presentation Prob-
lem
The rst component of the APPP agent is described in
Algorithm 1 and handles the task of eciently (linear in
output length) calculating a combined presentation for a
set of prospects s
c. The algorithm receives a set of sim-
ple prospects and outputs a hash map with all of the pos-
sible outcomes (as keys) and probabilities (as values). The
algorithm iterates via all prospects. In every iteration the
algorithm takes the previous iteration's result and doubles
it, once assuming that the current prospect obtained its out-
come and once assuming that the current prospect did not
yield its outcome. For example, consider a set of simple
prospects in which one prospect has a 25% chance to win
$37 and another prospect has a 60% chance to lose $10,
i.e. s = f((0:25;$37);(0:60;$   10)g. In the rst iteration,
with the prospect (0:25;$37), there will be only two possible
outcomes, 0 with a probability of 0:75 and $37 with a prob-
ability of 0:25. In the second (and last) iteration, with the
prospect (0:60;$   10), the algorithm will rst assume that
the (negative) outcome was not obtained (with a probability
of 0:40), and thus will have two possible outcomes: $37 with
a probability of 0:25  0:40 = 0:10 and $0 with a probability
of 0:75  0:40 = 0:30. Then the algorithm will add two addi-
tional outcomes, assuming that the outcome of the second
prospect ($   10) was obtained (with a probability of 0:60):
$27   $10 = $17 with a probability of 0:25  0:60 = 0:15 and
$0 + $   10 =  $10 with a probability of 0:75  0:60 = 0:45.
The second component of the APPP agent is described in
Algorithm 2. This is the procedure that solves the prospect
presentation problem. The input for Algorithm 2 is a set of
prospect sets, a cost function and a human decision policy.
Algorithm 1 Calculation of the combined presentation for
a set of prospects.
Input: s - A set of simple prospects s = fP1;P2;:::;Pkg,
where Pi = (P
p
i ;P
x
i ).
Output: s
c - A hash map holding all possible outcomes as
keys and their associated probabilities as values.
1: s
c[0]   1
2: for each prospect P in s do
3: s
c0   s
c
4: clear s
c
5: for each outcome in s
c0 do
6: s
c[outcome]   s
c0[outcome]  (1   P
p)
1
7: s
c[outcome + P
x]   s
c0[outcome]  P
p
8: end for
9: end for
10: return s
c
The output is a determination policy for each prospect set.
The determination policy determines whether to use the sep-
arate or the combined method for each prospect set. This
algorithm simply iterates via all sets of prospects and calcu-
lates, for each of the sets, which of the presentation methods
is more protable for the system, i.e. whether p(s;separate)
(1 c(separate)) is larger than p(s;combined)(1 c(combined))
or vice versa. Were the human decision policy to be known,
Algorithm 2 Procedure for solving the prospect presenta-
tion problem.
Input: A set composed of prospect sets S. A cost function
c(m(s)), and a human decision policy p(s;m(s)).
Output: A determination policy, m, for each of the
prospect sets.
1: for each problem s in S do
2: if p(s;separate)(1 c(separate)) > p(s;combined)
(1   c(combined)) then
3: set m(s)   separate;
4: else
5: set m(s)   combined;
6: end if
7: end for
the algorithm would have fully solved the prospect presen-
tation problem. However, in real life, a system agent facing
the prospect presentation problem is not likely to have ac-
cess to the human decision policy, p(s;m(s)). Therefore, the
major concern for an agent facing the prospect presentation
problem is to accurately model the human decision policy.
4.2 Decision Policy Modeling in APPP
An agent facing the prospect presentation problem does
not have specic information about the human user, and
therefore must use a general model for modeling human de-
cision policy. While several theories may be considered for
building this model, the Expected Utility Hypothesis and
Cumulative Prospect Theory denitely stand out as being
signicant in their eld. We therefore decided to embed each
of these theories in APPP's decision policy model, but it is
possible to embed other theories into the agent should one
1In 6 and 7, if s
c[outcome] or s
c[outcome+P
x] already have
a value, increment that value by s
c0[outcome]  (1   P
p) or
s
c0[outcome]  P
p respectively.want to. However, in both the expected utility hypothe-
sis and the cumulative prospect theory, a human's response
does not depend on the form of the presentation of the prob-
lem. This implies that both presentation methods (combined
and separated) would yield the same probability that the
user will accept a given lottery regardless of the lottery, i.e.
for any s, p(s;combined) = p(s;separate). This assumption
is clearly inappropriate for our work (and is shown to be
false in the results section). Therefore, each of the theories
requires a slight modication when considering the separate
representation method, by taking the bracketing eect (see
section 2.4) into account.
We use the following subsections to describe in detail how
each of the theories can be embedded into APPP. All of
the methods we test need to set some parameters, therefore
APPP requires training data. The data set,  , is composed
of a set of tuples < s;m(s);d >, in which s is a set of sim-
ple prospects presented to a human user, m(s) determines
whether the set of prospects were presented in the combined
method or in the separated method, and d is a boolean, in-
dicating whether or not the user decided to participate in
the lottery. In order to accurately model human decision-
making, it is essential to assume stochastic decision-making,
since the agent is required to evaluate the probability that a
user will accept a lottery. Not assuming stochastic decision-
making would mean that a lottery (possibly depending on
its presentation method) would either be accepted by every-
one or rejected by everyone, i.e. p(s;m(s)) 2 f0;1g. (It is
not required to assume that every individual actually uses
stochastic decision-making, but that the crowed as a whole
can be modeled as using stochastic decision-making.)
APPP assumes logit quantal response and thus relies on
Equation 6. Recall that in the prospect presentation prob-
lem, the user needs to choose between participating in a
prospect (or a set of simple prospects in the separate presen-
tation method) or not. Thus, the user must actually choose
between the lottery and the value of not participating in it,
denoted by U(null). In EUH, U(null) = u($W), where W is
the person's initial wealth, and in CPT, U(null) = v(0) = 0.
Therefore, given a lottery L, according to Equation 6, the
probability that a user will accept that lottery is:
p(L) =
1
1 + e

 
U(null) U(L)
 (8)
4.2.1 Modeling using Prospect Theory with Learned
Parameters
The rst model we consider for APPP's decision policy is
the cumulative prospect theory. We use cumulative prospect
theory, CPT, (see section 2.2) in order to evaluate U(L) for a
user facing the combined method (a single prospect). How-
ever, as mentioned above, when considering the separated
method (a set of simple prospects), APPP deviates from
CPT. For the instances in the data set using the combined
method of presentation, in which the user is only presented
with a single prospect (s
c), APPP calculates U(s
c) accord-
ing to Equation 3 (and Equations 4 and 5 for the value and
weighting functions respectively). APPP assumes that peo-
ple who face the separated method evaluate each prospect
separately and then combine all values together to receive
the total value of the lottery
2. This assumption is based
on the bracketing eect (see section 2.4), which suggests
that people treat each problem separately, and thus we as-
sume that they will evaluate each prospect separately. For-
mally, given a set of prospects, s, presented in the separated
method, the value of the set of prospects is given by:
U(s
s) =
X
P2s
U(P) (9)
APPP searches for parameters ;;;; and  that mini-
mize the mean squared error (MSE) between p(s;m(s)) and
the actual fraction of users in ( ) who accepted lottery s
(d = true) out of all of those who were shown that lottery
using m(s) as the presentation method. Once APPP has
set the parameters to use for the decision policy, it can be
used to determine how to present a new set of prospects.
Given a set of prospects, s, and a presentation mode, m(s);
if the presentation mode is combined, APPP uses Equations
8 and 3 and parameters ;;;; and . If the presen-
tation mode is separated, APPP uses Equations 8, 9 and
3 and the parameters (;;;; and ) to evaluate the
probability that the user will accept the associated lottery.
4.2.2 Modeling using Prospect Theory with Original
Parameters
We also investigated another possible model; it is the same
model described in 4.2.1, but rather than learning the pa-
rameters ;;; and , APPP uses the parameters pro-
posed by Kahneman and Tversky. That is,  = 0:88; =
0:88; = 2:25; = 0:61 and  = 0:69. APPP only uses the
data to evaluate .
4.2.3 Modeling using Expected Utility Hypothesis
As the Expected Utility Hypothesis is very well known,
we also show how to embed it into APPP. APPP, based on
EUH, uses Equations 1 and 2
3. As in the model assuming
CPT, we must determine how to account for sets of prospects
presented in the separated method. However, using EUH,
APPP may not simply use the exact same approach as when
using CPT, since in EUH, U(P) includes the initial wealth.
Therefore, if we were simply to add up the utilities from
all of the prospects (using Equation 9), we would end-up
adding the initial wealth several times. We therefore propose
a simple modication, using the following equation:
U(s
s) = u(W) +
X
P2s
 
U(P)   u(W)

(10)
APPP based on EUH, searches for parameters W and  that
minimize the mean squared error (MSE) between p(s;m(s))
and the actual fraction of users in ( ) who accepted lottery s
(d = true) out of all those who were shown that lottery using
m(s) as the presentation method. Given a set of prospects,
s, and a presentation mode, m(s); if the presentation mode
is combined, APPP uses Equations 8 and 1 and parameters
W and . If the presentation mode is separated, APPP
uses Equations 8, 10 and 1 and the parameters (W and
2This approach in an environment of only simple prospects
is actually similar to the assumptions made by the prospect
theory rather than CPT.
3In practice we also tried two dierent power functions, but
they yield the exact same results as the log function (pre-
sented in Section 5.2).) to evaluate the probability that the user will accept the
associated lottery.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Experimental Setup
We ran our experiments using Amazon's Mechanical Turk
(AMT) [1]. AMT has become an important tool for running
experiments and has been established as a viable method
for data collection [14]. We constructed a total of 120 sets
of simple prospects, with k (the number of simple prospects
in a set) varying between 3 and 5. The upper boundary
of 5 was chosen since the number of possible outcomes is
exponential in the number of k (2
5 = 32) and we didn't
want to present too many possible outcomes to the sub-
jects. Each simple prospect (P) had a random probability
(Pp) between 1% and 100% (only whole probabilities) and
a random expected outcome (Pp  Px) between  $15:00 and
+$15:00. For the human decision not to be trivial, every set
of prospects had at least one prospect with a negative out-
come and one with a positive outcome. For ethical reasons,
since we did not want to encourage traditional gambling,
we ensured that all gambles had a positive expected util-
ity. Therefore, a player that tries to maximize her expected
outcome should have accepted all gambles. Thus, the sub-
jects were not urged into a gamble which was not good for
them. We recruited a total of 612 participants. 58:1% of the
subjects were males and 41:9% were females. Subjects' ages
ranged from 18 to 73, with a mean of 31:6, a median of 29
and a standard deviation of 11:0. All subjects were residents
of the USA. The subjects were paid 30 cents to participate
in the experiment. Each subject was presented with 20 sets
of prospects, half in their original form and half as combined
prospects. This resulted in an average of approximately 50
instances for each of the 130 sets of prospects for each of the
two dierent presentation modes. The subjects were given
the following instructions: "Suppose you are facing the fol-
lowing lottery / set of lotteries, you may either participate
in it / in all lotteries or reject it / them all". (The exact
text depended on the mode of presentation of the current
set of prospects.) To enhance comprehension, we also pro-
vided the subjects with pie-charts presenting the prospects
(as used in [2]). The following explanation was provided:
"The following pie chart(s) which present(s) the lottery /
lotteries may assist you in making your decision." Figure 1
presents an example of a screen-shot for a subject facing a
set of prospects presented separately, and Figure 2 presents
an example of a screen-shot for a subject facing the same
set of prospects presented in the combined mode. Note that
there are 3 prospects in the separate mode, and thus 2
3 = 8
in the combined mode. We set the cost function to 0 for
the separated method and to 0:15 for the combined method.
This setting was chosen since we assume that the problem is
provided as the separate prospects and therefore some cost
is associated with presenting a combined prospect to the
user. A cost of 0:15 to the combined mode, equalizes the
performance of the combined mode to the separate mode.
5.2 Results
We ran APPP using 10-fold cross-validation on the data.
In every fold APPP was trained on 108 sets of prospects,
and tested on the remaining 12 sets of prospects. For each
of these sets, APPP had to decide whether to present the
Figure 1: A subject facing a set of prospects pre-
sented separately.
Figure 2: A subject facing a set of prospects pre-
sented in the combined mode.Agent Acceptance Combined Average Score Number of
rate presentation cost parameters
APPP 42:8% 37:5% 0:0266 0:401 6
APPP-KT 39:6% 16:7% 0:009 0:387 1
Combined 44:4% 100% 0:066 0:378 0
Separate/APPP-EUH 37:8% 0% 0 0:378 0   2
Table 1: Average performance of APPP compared to the other agents
prospects separately or combined. Figure 3 presents the per-
formance of APPP in three modes. The APPP refers to the
agent using the learned parameters as described in Section
4.2.1, APPP-KT refers to the agent that uses the param-
eters described by Kahneman and Tversky as explained in
Section 4.2.2 and APPP-EUH is the agent described in 4.2.3.
These versions of the agent are compared to an agent that al-
ways presents the combined mode and an agent that always
presents the separate mode
4. APPP signicantly (p < 0:01
using a paired t-test on the score obtained from every set of
prospects) outperformed all other methods, and yielded an
increase of 6% in the average score over the two baselines.
Recall that APPP may only control the method of presenta-
tion to the users (and not the actual lotteries), therefore this
achievement is very impressive. Table 1 provides additional
details regarding the acceptance rate of APPP and the base-
line agents. As can be observed by the table, the combined
mode enjoyed a much greater acceptance rate than the sepa-
rate mode. This clearly demonstrates that the presentation
mode has an impact on the human acceptance rate, justify-
ing our initial assumptions. However, recall that presenting
the combined method requires some additional eort and is
therefore assumed to be associated with some cost. If this
cost is reduced, the combined mode becomes much more
appealing, and vice versa, as the cost increases, the sepa-
rated mode becomes more appealing. It is not surprising
that APPP yields a slightly lower acceptance rate than the
combined agent, since, as mentioned, many more subjects
accept the combined mode than the separated mode, and
APPP chose to present the combined mode only in 37:5%
of the sets. APPP-EUH did not present the combined mode
in any of the sets. This was not because it assumed that
using the separate mode is more appealing to the user, but
because it was not willing to pay the cost associated with
presenting the combined mode (if the cost was totally re-
moved, APPP-EUH would present the combine mode in 94%
of the sets). Recall that the expected outcome on all lotter-
ies was always positive, yet on average people still accepted
less than 50% of the lotteries. The pie-charts did indeed
help the subjects' decision-making process, as 79:1% said
that the pie-charts helped them and only 19:6% said that
they didn't help them. Only 6 subjects (less than %1) said
that they did not understand the pie-charts. While the total
average of participation in the lotteries was 41:5%, females
participated on average in only 37:9%, which is signicantly
lower (p < 0:01 using ANOVA test) than males who partic-
ipated on average in 44:1% of the lotteries. This indicates
4The black bars represent the condence interval with  =
0:05 of the delta between each score for every set of prospects
and the minimum between the score obtained by the two
presentation methods for that set of prospects. This was
done to partially eliminate the variance that comes from the
dierence between the dierent set of prospects, of which
some are much more attractive than others.
Figure 3: Average score obtained by each of the
methods.
that females are more risk averse than males (this nding
was also present in many studies such as [5]). We also found
that young people, up to age 29 (which was our median),
are signicantly (p < 0:01) more likely to participate in the
lottery than people aged 30 and above (44:0% vs. 37:7%)
5.
Risk aversion also seems to decrease with education, as sub-
jects with only a high school education (49:6%) participated
in 43:3% of the lotteries, while subjects with a bachelor's or
a master's degree or a PhD participated in only 39:7% of
the lotteries (these results dier statistically with p < 0:05,
however, these results may be explained by the fact that the
younger subjects tend to have lower education). Interest-
ingly, while the gap between the males and females partici-
pating in the lotteries was smaller when the prospects were
combined (6:93% vs. 5:62%), the gap between the young
subjects and the older ones was almost doubled in size when
the presentation mode was combined (4:29% vs. 8:31%).
This nding may encourage future work on a personalized
agent based on demographic data alone.
5.3 Discussion and Future Work
In this study we used k <= 5 (the number of simple
prospects in a set). It remains questionable, what will hap-
pen as the number of prospect selection problems increases.
In such a case, the pie chart may become very complex as
the number of outcome options increases exponentially. One
option is to group together similar outcomes, but still it is
unclear how to do so. Another interesting question is what
happens for lower values of k. Lower values of k should en-
able a better evaluation of the problem and a better compre-
5Proportionately, we had more males subjects in the
younger group, however, this observation alone does not ex-
plain the dierences in the attitude towards lotteries be-
tween the groups. We also note that 4 subjects did not
provide their ages.hension of the agent's advice; it remains to be seen how this
aects the users' interaction with the agent. We chose the
pie charts (combined and separate) in order to enhance com-
prehension of the proposed prospects. The users provided
positive feedback to these charts. It would be interesting
to study how much of a role they played in the user accep-
tance rates. Enhancing APPP to include more presentation
modes or other visual enhancements would be an interesting
extension of this study. Using CPT with learned parame-
ters was shown to outperform other methods. In the future
we would like to consider replacing the value and weighting
functions suggested by Tversky and Kahneman to see if it
is possible to further improve the APPP's performance.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the prospect presentation prob-
lem, in which users are presented with sets of prospects that
must be accepted or rejected as a group (such as an invest-
ment portfolio). We refer to a system that gains a positive
utility when clients accept the prospects (decide to invest).
We dened the prospect presentation problem as determin-
ing, for each set of prospects, which presentation mode to
use in order to maximize the system's utility. We presented
the APPP agent that solves the prospect presentation prob-
lem and chooses between representations of complex bene-
cial proposals. APPP uses Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) in order to model human decision-making and uses
the model to select the better representation method for a
set of prospects. We demonstrated that xing the presenta-
tion method to always present the prospects separately, or
always present them combined, results in a lower score than
using APPP to select the presentation mode based on the
human model and a given set of prospects. We investigated
several variations on decision process models and found that
using CPT results in the most successful agent for selecting
the presentation mode. Furthermore, learning the param-
eters for CPT from sets of prospects presented in the two
presentation modes resulted in a better agent than simply
using the parameters elicited by Kahneman and Tversky
in their original study. We show that the combined method
yields much higher acceptance rates, and thus, if the cost as-
sociated with presenting the combined method is very low,
it may be more benecial for the system to always use the
combined mode. If the cost is not negligible, we suggest us-
ing APPP for determining which sets to present separately
and which to present combined.
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